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ABSTRACT  
 In order to assess the continuing imbalance of top executives between genders, I 
examine the effects of gender diversity within top management teams on firm risk, 
performance, and executive compensation. Capitalizing on previous analysis, I apply 
three unique differentiators. First, I utilize current data from 2012 to 2017 from 
Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp. Second, I provide a unique subset view on a firm 
and individual performance of female CEOs to examine executive compensation. Third, 
my scope of analysis expands to S&P Composite 1500 companies. I use separate models 
to estimate the effect of gender diversity on firm risk by examining a firm’s beta and 
standard deviation of daily returns, on firm performance by examining a firm’s Tobin’s 
Q, and lastly on executive compensation by examining an executive’s natural logarithm 
of total compensation. My findings suggest gender diversity among executives appears to 
have an immaterial effect on a firm’s risk and performance. In turn, I also find that 
female executives continue to receive less compensation than their male colleagues. 
However, I find an average female CEO receives a higher level of compensation than an 
average male CEO. Lastly, I find as gender diversity increases among executives, 
specifically CEOs, the compensation differences between genders decreases. 
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I. Introduction  
 Equality benefits everyone, both in and outside the workplace (Catalyst 2018). In 
recent years, women in executive and management roles have experienced a resurgence 
of focus due to the fact that women have made considerable advances in the workforce 
(Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007; Jurkus, Park, and Woodard 2011; Melero 
2011). In 2018, 44.7% of total employees in S&P 500 companies are women (Catalyst 
2018). Despite improvement in overall employment trends, women still remain 
underrepresented as a whole at the executive and CEO level. The number of female 
CEOs reached a high of 24 CEOs in 2018, which represents only 4.8% of CEO positions 
at S&P 500 companies (Catalyst 2018)1. The continuing imbalance of top executives 
between males and females makes gender diversity a relevant and timely topic of 
consideration for both researchers and practitioners.      
 Existing literature in the United States documents the presence of gender diversity 
within top executive roles in S&P 500 companies with regards to both firm and 
individual level outcomes. It shows that gender diversity reduces firm risk (Khan and 
Vieito 2013; Perryman, Fernando, and Tripathy 2015), improves firm performance 
(Dwyer, Richard & Chadwick 2003; Krishnan & Parsons 2008; Perryman, Fernando, and 
Tripathy 2015), and also plays a role in reducing the wage gap at the top executive level 
(Elkinawy and Stater 2011; Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey 2011; Perryman et al. 
2015). Existing literature has focused on gender diversity within executives however, 
                                                          
1 The number of female CEOs in this study is higher than 24 female CEOs due to the fact that the 
Executive Compensation database covers S&P 1500 companies plus companies that were once a 
part of the 1500 plus companies removed from the index that are still trading, as well as some 
client requests.    
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previous studies generally do not distinguish out female CEOs from other top female 
executives. As gender diversity continues to evolve and improve, the topics of firm risk, 
performance, and executive compensation should be revisited with more recent data in 
order to understand and measure the improvement and the effect of the changes within 
the workforce.  
 I expand upon analysis in current literature and focus on three major areas. First, I 
utilize recent data from 2012 to 2017 as compared to the analysis of the literature, which 
examines data from 1992 to 2012. Second, I provide a unique subset view on the firm and 
individual performance of female CEOs in regards to executive compensation as 
compared to the combined female executive/CEO analysis of existing literature. Lastly, I 
extend the analysis of firms to S&P Composite 1500 companies as compared to S&P 500 
companies in previous studies. This more comprehensive coverage of firms helps the 
examination of how gender diversity may influence firm risk, performance and executive 
compensation.  
 Using data from ExecuComp, CRSP, and Compustat, the analysis in this paper 
finds that gender diversity does not influence firm risk or firm performance. My findings 
are different from the existing literature. Specifically, Perryman et al. (2015) find that as 
gender diversity increases, firm risk falls and firm performance improves. The 
differences in results between this study and existing literature may be due to the 
different time period analyzed and/or due to the broadening scope of firms examined 
from S&P 500 companies to S&P 1500 companies. The different findings of this study 
also may represent the progress and improvements of the workplace as firms strive to be 
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more gender inclusive and work towards a more gender blind economy. An increase in 
gender diversity appears to no longer effect firm risk and performance in a significant 
way. Consistent with Perryman et al. (2015), the results of this study still find that male 
executives receive a higher compensation than female executives. Also consistent with 
the literature, the findings of this study suggest that as gender diversity increases among 
executives, specifically CEOs, the gender wage gap narrows between executives.  
 The remainder of my paper proceeds as follows: Section II covers the literature 
review, providing background on existing topics relating to gender diversity. Section III 
discusses the data. Section IV presents the empirical strategy and results of my study. 
And lastly, Section V concludes and interjects the limitations of my study as well as areas 
for future research.  
II. Literature Review 
 Recently, the female’s share of the total labor force in S&P 500 companies 
decreased from 46.8% in 2016 to 44.7% in 2018 according to the Catalyst (2018). The 
share of women currently holding CEO positions at S&P 500 companies has also 
decreased from 5.2% in 2016 to only 4.8% in 2018. There are currently only 24 women 
holding CEO positions at S&P 500 companies as of October 3, 2018 (Catalyst 2018). The 
relationship between gender diversity, firm risk and performance, and executive 
compensation is still a relatively new area of inquiry due to the ever changing landscape 
of gender diversity within firms (Khan and Vieito 2013). In recent years, women have 
made considerable advances, which has caused a resurgence of focus on women in 
management and executive roles (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007; Jurkus, Park, 
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and Woodard 2011; Melero 2011). The following sub-sections summarize the existing 
literature on gender diversity, firm risk and performance, and executive compensation.    
2.1 Gender Diversity  
 According to Kreitz (2008), diversity is broadly defined as any significant 
difference that distinguishes one individual from another. Previous literature on diversity 
breaks diversity into two classifications: the observable or demographic and the non-
observable or cognitive (Maznevski 1994; Milliken & Martins 1996; Boeker 1997; 
Petersen 2000). Gender, age, race, and ethnicity fall under demographic diversity (Pelled 
1996; Timmerman 2000) while knowledge, education, values, perception, affection, and 
personality characteristics fall under cognitive diversity (Watson et al. 1998; Kilduff, 
Angelmar, and Mehra 2000). However, with gender, demographic diversity is still 
associated with cognitive diversity in the sense that females are associated with different 
perceptual views and potentially derive different solutions for the same problems (Dutton 
and Duncan 1987). As gender diversity continues to evolve and women and minorities 
are becoming a larger proportion of the workforce in comparison to white males, firms 
are experiencing a change in the pool of applicants for high-ranking officer positions 
(Holton 1995; Burke 1997; Conyon and Mallin 1997; Burke and Nelson 2002). The 
increasing number of female applicants and females in top manager positions means the 
firm’s cognitive perspectives may be altered, thus the overall environment of the firm 
may change as a result (Wiersema and Bantel 1992). Exploring the impact and influence 
that gender diversity possesses within firms and top executives is important to 
understanding the dynamics of a firm’s risk, performance, compensation, and future.  
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2.2 Firm Risk and Performance  
 Past studies present findings that suggest men and women behave differently in 
the workplace, especially when money and finances are involved (Barber and Odean 
2001; Bliss and Potter 2002). Therefore, understanding the relationship between gender 
and firm risk aversion levels and performance can be a telling factor of a firm’s future 
success. The firm risk level tends to be smaller when the CEO is a woman compared to 
when the CEO is a man (Khan and Vieito 2013). Perryman, Fernando, and Tripathy 
(2015) complement this information and finds that an increase in gender diversity among 
executives reduces firm risk and improves firm performance.  
Previous research suggests that greater gender diversity in top management teams 
may lead to broader and deeper considerations of strategic choices (Upadhyay and Zeng 
2014), more open and thoughtful consideration of divergent views, and more complete 
information processing (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan 2004). Women are 
thought to be more focused on helping people, while men are more concerned with 
money making and advancing their positions in a company (Betz, O’Connell, and 
Shepard 1989; Bernardi and Arnold 1997). Another difference that impacts the dynamics 
of top management teams is that men are generally more overconfident than women, and 
the difference in overconfidence is highly task dependent (Lundeberg, Fox, and 
Puncochar 1994). Prince (1993) finds that men are inclined to feel more competent than 
women in financial matters as finance is typically viewed as a more masculine task. 
Complementing this information, Marinelli, Mazzoli, and Palmucci (2016) find that 
gender is responsible for differences in investment behavior between men and women. 
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The main results of previous literature indicate that women hold lower proportions of 
risky assets (Halko, Kaustia, and Alanko 2012), women are more risk averse (Dohmen et 
al. 2011), and women also trade less and are less overconfident than men (Barber and 
Odean 2001). However, despite the difference in investment behavior, there is no 
difference in the portfolio liquidity and diversification between men and women, which 
suggests that there is not a gender gap in the quality of portfolios (Marinelli et al. 2016). 
Khan and Vieito (2013) also indicate that in certain circumstances, pursuing less risky 
activities does not equate to sub-optimal performance choices.  
 Speaking more specifically on the relationship between gender and firm 
performance, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find that firms with more women senior 
executives and greater gender diversity in senior management are associated with 
improved higher earnings quality and high stock returns after the IPO process. Erhardt, 
Werbel, and Shrader’s (2003) findings also suggest that gender diversity is associated 
with higher firm profitability as compared to the average in their sector. Complementing 
this information, Dwyer, Richard, and Chadwick (2003) find that the impact of gender 
diversity on firm performance is conditional on the organizational context in which it 
resides, suggesting that gender diversity in top management teams should enhance the 
performance of firms seeking growth. Despite the decrease in the number of female 
CEOs from 2016 to 2018, literature shows that firms with female CEOs are associated 
with an increase in performance compared to the firms managed by male CEOs (Khan 
and Vieito 2013). The gender composition of a firm not only impacts a firm’s risk and 
performance but also influences a firm’s executive compensation.  
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2.3 Executive Compensation  
 The gap between male and female compensation still exists but it is slowly 
narrowing over time (Khan and Vieito 2008). Elkinawy and Stater (2011) find the gender 
wage gap is diminishing at the CEO level. In Bell’s (2005) study, she finds that women 
earn 8-25 percent less than males within similar age range, firm size, job title, and 
industry. Since Bell’s study, Elkinawy and Stater (2011) find that the base salaries 
received by female executives improved to a range of only 4.5-5.5 percent lower than 
those of male executives holding similar executive roles and holding constant firm and 
board characteristics. The relative compensation for women has huge implications for the 
efficiency of the executive labor market and thus has a consequent impact on the 
economy (Elkinawy and Stater 2011).  
 To motivate executives to act in the best interests of shareholders, compensation 
risk is imposed on executives by linking firm performance to executives’ pay package 
(Core, Wayne, and Larcker 2003). However, Khan and Vieito (2013) find that boards do 
not appear to consider the risk aversion differences between male and female CEOs when 
they design the compensation packages since they award female CEOs practically the 
same proportions of risky compensation components as they award to male CEOs. 
Hersch (1998) indicates that women prefer to find safer jobs, yet when they perform risky 
jobs, they receive on average, less than men who are performing the same functions. 
Elkinawy and Stater (2011) conclude that inferior compensation could deter female 
professionals from making the sacrifices and negotiations necessary to pursue top 
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executive careers, even when such pursuits would increase the profitability of 
corporations as well as the productivity and incomes of other workers.   
 Women make up a small percentage of top executives (Catalyst 2018) and those 
who advance may suffer from the lack, or total absence, of senior female mentors and 
role models to help guide career advancement, promotion decisions, negotiations, and 
other development opportunities (Scandura and Williams 2001). Previous studies suggest 
that gender may influence compensation negotiations in that women are often more 
uncomfortable than men declaring their own monetary worth (Barron, 2003). 
Complementing this information, Babcock and Laschever (2009) find that women tend to 
negotiate less than men. Previous studies have also suggested that an increase in gender 
diversity may alter a woman’s perspective on compensation and promotion as well as 
improve a women’s negotiating skills through consultation with other women in positions 
of power. The key findings in Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey’s (2011) study show that 
an increase in the number of female top managers is associated with a subsequent 
increase in the share of women in mid-level management positions within firms, 
controlling for firm size, working-force composition, federal contractor status, firm fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and industry-specific trends. 
 Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010) find that in women-led firms, compensation 
for female managers improves while male compensation decreases, which in turn leads to 
a decreasing gender wage gap. Perryman, Fernando, and Tripathy (2015) complement 
this information, finding that an increase in gender diversity plays a role in reducing the 
wage gap at the top executive level. Until there is equal status between males and females 
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in terms of representation and compensation, gender equality cannot exist in the business 
world (Perryman et al. 2015). In order to combat gender inequality, it is important to 
analyze and understand the effects of gender within firms.    
2.4 Limitations of Existing Literature  
Although the aforementioned studies, specifically Perryman et al. (2015), make 
important strides in increasing our understanding of the effects of gender diversity on 
firm risk, performance and executive compensation, they experience three key 
shortcomings and limitations. First, Perryman et al. (2015) uses data from 1992 to 2012, 
which is rather dated given the fact that the composition of women in executive and 
management roles has evolved since 2012 (Catalyst 2018). As change occurs, the topics 
of firm risk, performance and executive compensation should be re-assessed in order to 
gauge progress and make firm decisions based on data that reflects the current workforce 
demographic (Perryman et al. 2015). Second, Perryman et al. (2015) does not include a 
variable to observe if a CEO is a female in their study. Therefore, they cannot address the 
specific effects that a female CEO may have on a firm. Arguably, the CEO of a firm 
stands at the top of the work pyramid and all other executives and firm members take 
cues from the CEO. As such, the CEO greatly impacts the firm’s success and future. It is 
important to test the individual effect of a female CEO in addition to females at the 
executive level to better understand the influence that gender diversity has on a firm. 
Finally, Perryman et al. (2015) restricts their study to only S&P 500 companies, thus 
limiting the scope of analysis of gender diversity to only large cap companies. The S&P 
Composite 1500 combines the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 
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600 to cover approximately 90% of U.S. market capitalization. By broadening the 
analysis to S&P Composite 1500 firms, new findings and insight on female 
representation within top management teams could be provided. Extending the analysis 
may also provide a more holistic perspective on the impact of gender diversity the overall 
economy.          
 This paper aims to address the shortcomings and limitations in the existing 
literature and to identify any possible changes that gender diversity may have on firms 
and the U.S. economy. By analyzing data from 2012 to 2017, I provide findings that are 
more representative of current work environments than previous literature, which only 
incorporates data from years prior to 2013. I examine the specific effect female CEOs 
have on a firm and explore whether the presence of a female CEO makes an impact on 
executive compensation within companies. Lastly, I extend the scope of analysis is from 
S&P 500 companies to S&P Composite 1500 companies. The broader range of firms may 
result in new findings on the effect of gender diversity within the economy than previous 
literature does. The following section discusses the data of the study.    
III. Data  
 From Warton Research Data Services (WRDS), I use data from Compustat, 
CRSP, and ExecuComp from 2012 to 2017. These data sets are ideal for the purpose of 
my study because they include detailed variables on gender diversity (e.g., gender of 
executives), firm risk (e.g., daily returns and firm beta), firm performance (e.g., market 
and book value of assets), and executive compensation (e.g., total compensation and 
salary). The large sample size allows for reasonably precise results by gender. The 
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sample includes executives from S&P 1500 companies. All firms are included with the 
exception of financial and utility firms since they are both regulated industries (Perryman 
et al. 2015). I exclude financial firms also because the high leverage that is normal for 
these firms typically do not have the same meaning for non-financial firms, where high 
leverage more likely indicates distress (Fama and French 1992).   
 The data for firm risk is from Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp and consists of 
6,500 firm-year observations, which equates to 1,478 firms. The data for firm 
performance is obtained from Compustat and ExecuComp and consists of 6,788 firm-
year observations, which equates to 1,512 firms. Lastly, data for executive compensation 
is from Compustat and ExecuComp and consists of 35,647 observations for 11,967 
individual executives from 1,508 firms. Although the samples are different in terms of 
the number of observations, the characteristics of the firms are similar in nature. Thus for 
the sake of brevity, only the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the 
independent variables of interest of each sample are discussed. Summary statistics for all 
samples, however, are presented in Table 2.  
 In this paper, I create two measures of firm risk based on two well-established 
proxies: beta, which is labeled ‘Beta’, and the standard deviation of daily returns, which 
is labeled ‘StdRet’ (Amit and Livnat 1988; Chandra, Childs, and Ro 2001). ‘Beta’ 
measures the systemic risk of an individual firm and is the degree of congruence a firm’s 
stock price displays with the price movement of the overall market. ‘Beta’ is calculated 
through Beta Suite by WRDS. In this paper, I estimate ‘Beta’ using a Market Model risk 
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model with a monthly frequency and log returns.2 The alternative measure of risk, 
‘StdRet’, is calculated by using daily holding period returns from CRSP. The variable 
‘StdRet’ is annualized in order to assess and compare the volatility and risk of firms.3 See 
Table 1 for all variable definitions. Panel A of Table 2 reveals a mean ‘Beta’ of 1.22 and 
a mean ‘StdRet’ of 0.32. A company with a higher beta has greater risk and also greater 
expected returns. A mean ‘Beta’ of 1.22 shows that the average company is more volatile 
than the market. The standard deviation of daily returns sheds light on historical volatility 
and measures the risk that an investment will not meet the expected return in a given 
period. The annualized ‘StdRet’ of 0.32 shows how dispersed the average companies’ 
returns are and thus implies the riskiness of the average firms.     
 To evaluate firm performance, I use Tobin’s Q, which is labeled ‘TQ’, as a proxy. 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets to the book value of the 
firm’s assets. The market value of a firm’s assets is computed as the sum of the market 
value of its outstanding equity and debt (Tobin 1969). I compute ‘TQ’ in this paper 
according to Brown and Caylor’s (2006) study.4 Panel B of Table 2 reveals an average 
Tobin’s Q of 2.096. When a company’s Tobin’s Q is above 1 that means that the firm is 
worth more than the cost of its assets, which may imply that the firm is overvalued. 
                                                          
2 In Beta Suite by WRDS, a Date Range of 2012-01-01 to 2017-12-31 was selected. For the 
Frequency Selection, Monthly with an Estimation Window of 24 and a Minimum Window of 24 
was selected. The Risk Model selected was the Market Model and Log Return was selected for 
the Return Type.  
3 The descriptive statistics for variable ‘StdRet’ differ than the descriptive statistics found in 
Perryman et al. (2015) due to annualizing the standard deviation of daily returns. In this paper, 
annualizing the variable ‘StdRet’ is used because it is a way of standardizing on a measure to 
make comparisons easier. Perryman et al. (2015) did not annualize their ‘StdRet’ variable.    
4 ‘TQ’ is computed using the following equation: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠+(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔∗𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)−𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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However, typically a higher Tobin’s Q represents a greater firm performance. A mean 
Tobin’s Q of 2.096 implies that the average firm is earning at a rate higher than its 
replacement cost.  
In this paper, the measure of total compensation is based on the combined total of 
an executive’s salary, bonuses, and stock options. I create a variable ‘Comp’, which is the 
natural log of total compensation. Panel C of Table 2 reveals that an average total 
compensation an executive receives is $3,225,579. The difference in average total 
compensation of executives between males and females is around half a million dollars, 
which indicates the persisting wage gap between genders.   
Following Perryman et al. (2015), I define gender diversity as the degree of 
representation of female executives in top management teams as reported in ExecuComp 
(Baixauli-Soler, Belda-Ruiz., and Sanchez-Martin 2015). In particular, I calculate the 
gender diversity variable, ‘Gender’, as the number of female executives scaled by the 
total number of executives reported in ExecuComp for a given firm in a given year 
(Baixauli-Soler et al. 2015). Panel C of Table 2, shows that the average percentage of 
female representation within top management teams in this sample is 7.15%. Perryman et 
al. (2015) finds an average percentage of female representation among executives of only 
5.19%. A main reason for the average percentage increase of female representation may 
be because this study broadens the range of the firms included from S&P 500 companies 
to the S&P Composite 1500 companies. The increase in female representation could also 
imply a shift in the workforce.  
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I introduce two indicator variables, ‘DGender’, which is equal to 1 if the 
executive is a female and zero otherwise and ‘DCEO’, which is equal to 1 if the 
executive is a CEO and zero otherwise. I also create two interaction variables: ‘FGender’, 
an interaction variable between ‘DGender’ and ‘Gender’ and ‘FCEO’, an interaction 
variable between ‘DGender’ and ‘DCEO’. The interaction variables evaluate the 
moderating effect of gender diversity. Similar to the mean of ‘Gender’, I find an average 
‘DGender’ of 7.31% in this study. Again, Perryman et al. (2015) finds a lower average 
“DGender’ of 4.81%, which may be caused by either the inclusion of S&P 1500 firms or 
shifts in female representation in executive positions. The average ‘DCEO’ is around 
16%, however, the average ‘FCEO’, which represents female CEOs, is only 0.68%.      
3.1 Female Representation of Top Executives  
Before running the models in this study, I examine the data by high and low 
percentages of female representation among executives in order to gain an initial 
understanding of whether or not there are differences in outcomes. Panels A and B of 
Table 2 break up the descriptive statistics by female representation for firm risk and 
performance variables. Panel C of Table 2 breaks up the descriptive statistics by gender 
and CEO gender for executive compensation variables. In Panels A and B, ‘High’ 
represents variable statistics of firms with a 13% or higher proportion of females within 
their executive team. The firms within ‘High’ female representation belong in the 75th 
percentile of the variable ‘Gender’. To gain a preliminary understanding of potential 
gender discrepancies, I examine any statistically significant differences between the 
means of the dependent variables of all three models by gender. 
20 
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A of Table 2 provide suggestive evidence that an 
increased presence of females in top management teams reduces the overall riskiness of 
the firm. Specifically, the mean ‘Beta’ for firms with ‘High’ female representation is 
1.19, while the mean ‘Beta’ for firms with ‘Low’ female representation is 1.23. Firms 
with lower ‘Beta’ are less volatile than the market and therefore possess less risk. The 
difference in mean ‘Beta’ between ‘High’ and ‘Low’ is significant at the 10% level for a 
one-tailed test. For ‘StdRet’, the average standard deviation of daily returns for firms 
with ‘High’ female representation is 0.32. The mean ‘StdRet’ for firms with ‘Low’ 
gender diversity is 0.34. Firms with lower female representation have a higher ‘StdRet’, 
which implies more dispersed returns and higher risk. The difference in mean ‘StdRet’ 
between ‘High’ and ‘Low’ gender diversity with firms is statistically significant at the 
1% level for a two-tailed test.   
In addition, preliminary evidence indicates that as the number of females among 
the executive team increases, the performance of the firm declines. In other words, firms 
with higher female representation are associated with a lower Tobin’s Q. In particular, 
the mean of ‘TQ’ for firms with ‘High’ female representation is 2.02. However, the mean 
of ‘TQ’ for firms with ‘Low’ gender diversity is higher with a mean value of 2.12. As a 
proxy for future investment opportunities and firm performance, the higher ‘TQ’ for 
firms with lower female representation provides suggestive evidence that female 
executives may actually hurt a firm’s success. The difference in mean ‘TQ’ between 
‘High’ and ‘Low’ is statistically significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed test.  
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Column 2 and 3 in Panel C of Table 2 provide initial evidence that female 
executives get paid less than male executives. In particular, the mean log of total 
compensation of female executives is only 7.39 and female executives receive an average 
total compensation of $2,747,333. Male executives receive a mean total compensation of 
$3,263,299 and an average log compensation of 7.56. The findings show that female 
executives receive less compensation than male executives. The differences in mean 
compensation by gender is statistically significant at the 1% level for a two-tailed test.  
I also examine the statistical differences in CEO compensation between genders. 
The results I find provide suggestive evidence that as gender diversity increases within 
top management teams, the gender wage gap between executive compensation narrows. 
Reversing the trend found between genders at the executive level, I find suggestive 
evidence that female CEOs receive a higher total compensation than male CEOs. In 
particular, the mean log of total compensation of female CEOs is 8.52 while the mean log 
of compensation for male CEOs is only 7.55. Columns 4 and 5 of Panel C in Table 2 
reveal that female CEOs receive a mean total compensation of $8,072,677 while male 
CEOs receive a mean total compensation of $3,192,473. The difference in mean 
compensation between female and male CEOs is statistically significant at the 1% level 
for a two-tailed test.    
Taken together, I find suggestive evidence that having more females on the 
executive team reduces firm risk and decreases firm performance. I also find preliminary 
evidence that female executives receive lower compensation than male executives. 
However, Columns 4 and 5 in Panel C of Table 2 provide initial evidence that as the 
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number of female executives and CEOs increase, the gender wage gap between executive 
compensation narrows. In the remainder of this paper, I formally analyze the patterns 
found in the descriptive analysis.  
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results  
 I use separate models to estimate the effects of gender diversity on firm risk, 
performance, and executive compensation. For all models, I use OLS and adjust the 
standard errors to correct for auto correlation by clustering by firm for the firm risk and 
performance models and clustering by firm and year for the executive compensation 
model as per Peterson (2009).5 Moreover, I include year and industry fixed effects in all 
the models to control for possible time and industry specific effects not captured by the 
explanatory variables. The industries are classified based on the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification (Fama and French 1997). Each model and their respective results are 
discussed in turn.  
 Currently there are no S&P 500 firms that are composed entirely of female top 
managers and executives and thus are currently beyond testing. Arguments for increased 
diversity, regardless of factor, propose equal representation, which suggest maximization 
at 50% instead of 100% (Perryman et al. 2015). Therefore, this forecast referencing the 
                                                          
5 Perryman et al. (2015) clusters by firm and year for their firm risk and performance model. 
However, my study’s sample for firm risk and performance are already clustered by unique firm 
year observations, so I only cluster by firm and not by firm year like the previous literature.   
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proportion of female executives should not be interpreted as maximization to capacity, 
but instead to achieve equal balance.6 
4.1 Firm Risk 
 I evaluate the impact of the presence of females in top management teams on firm 
risk by estimating the following model: 
(1)    𝑅𝑓𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑦 + 𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑𝑌 + 𝜖𝑓𝑦 
 where ‘Rfy’ is the firm risk set by two variables ‘Betafy’ and ‘StdRetfy’ where f and y 
represent a firm and year, respectively. X is a vector of observable characteristics 
consisting of ‘Size’, which is the natural logarithm of total assets, ‘lnDBEQ’, which is the 
natural logarithm of debt to equity ratio, ‘FirmAge’, which is the natural logarithm of 
firm age, and ‘stdEPS’, which is the standard deviation of earnings over the previous five 
years. The control variables of ‘Size’, ‘LnDBEQ’ and ‘StdEPS’ are adopted from 
Chandra et al. (2001). As firm ‘Size’ increases, the risk associated with the firm 
decreases. When a firm’s debt to equity ratio increases, so when ‘lnDBEQ’ increases, the 
risk to the firm increases. I include ‘FirmAge’ as a control variable since younger firms 
are associated with greater risk. Finally, I include ‘stdEPS’ as a control variable since 
higher earnings variability, is associated with greater firm risk. ‘Ind’ is an industry fixed 
effect, ‘Y’ is a year fixed effect, and ε is an error term with the usual properties. I cluster 
the sample for firm risk by firm. The independent variable of interest is ‘Genderfy’, which 
is the proportion of female executives in a firm f in a given year y. I hypothesizes that 
                                                          
6 For future studies, people could run sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the results 
by first re-estimating all models in this study using a matched pair sample where you match firms 
that had at least one female with firms that had no females by year, industry, and firm size. 
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firms with greater gender diversity in executive and CEO positions will display less risk 
than firms with lower levels of gender diversity.  
 Table 3 shows the results when the proxy for risk is ‘Betafy’ and ‘StdRetfy’, 
respectively. Column 7 of Table 3 reveals that the ‘Genderfy’ variable is statistically 
insignificant for both firm risk proxies. The results differ from existing literature, which 
find that an increased presence of females among executive teams reduces the overall 
riskiness of a firm (Perryman et al. 2015). However, examining the findings for the firm 
risk proxy of standard deviation of daily return, Column 6 in Panel B of Table 3 reveals 
the coefficient of ‘Genderfy’ is negative and significant (Coefficient = -0.050; s.e. = 
0.021) without the industry fixed effects. These results imply that the presence of a 
female in top management teams lowers the standard deviation of daily returns, 
indicating a reduction in firm risk. Every industry may have different levels of female 
representation on their executive team, which itself may be driven by discrimination. The 
potential endogeneity of the industry fixed effect variable may therefore be eliminating 
the effect of gender composition of the executive team and causing the insignificance of 
variable ‘Genderfy’. Nevertheless, with the all the fixed effects included, the findings of 
Column 7 in Table 3 do not support the existing literature on gender diversity and 
reducing firm risk. An explanation for the differences in findings may be due to the fact 
that I broaden the scope of firms analyzed to S&P Composite 1500 and I do not limit my 
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study to only large cap companies.7 Also, I analyze data from more current time periods 
than previous literature.8  
 Exploring explanations from existing literature, I postulate the insignificance of 
the variable ‘Gender’ may also be influenced by the opposing investment and 
management tendencies of gender. Women are found to be more risk averse (Dohmen et 
al. 2011) and less overconfident (Barber and Odean 2001), while men are found to be 
more risk tolerant (Marinelli et al. 2016) and feel more competent than women in 
financial matters (Prince 1993). In terms of management tendencies, women are thought 
to be more focused on helping people (Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard 1989; Bernardi and 
Arnold 1997) while men are more concerned with money making and advancing their 
position in a company (Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard 1989; Bernardi and Arnold 1997). 
As females continue to advance in the workplace, the contrasting tendencies of gender 
may diminish or have a smaller degree of impact on a firm’s risk as found in the results 
of my study. The findings of my study suggest that gender diversity appears to have a 
neutral effect on firm risk despite what existing literature suggest about behavioral 
differences between genders. As gender diversity increases, the neutral effect on firm risk 
may indicate greater equality of gender influence on a firm. Overall, these results reject 
the hypothesis and suggest that gender diversity appears to have neutral effect on firm 
risk, suggesting the risk of a firm may be evolving to be more gender blind 
                                                          
7 Table 6 reveals the findings for the firm risk estimation model, restricting the sample to S&P 
500 companies. The results vary from my study’s main finding and also differs from the existing 
literature. Further research could be done to explain why Table 6’s findings differ.   
8 For future work, I could run sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the results related 
to gender diversity and risk, by re-estimating model (1) using leverage as an alternative proxy for 
firm risk. This study could also re-estimate model (1) with idiosyncratic risk (Perryman et al., 
2015).     
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4.2 Firm Performance  
 In order to evaluate whether the proportion of female executives in top 
management teams impacts firm performance, I estimate an equation of the following 
form:    
(2)   𝑇𝑄𝑓𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑦 + 𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑𝑌 + 𝜖𝑓𝑦 
where ‘TQfy’ is the measure of Tobin’s Q, which is a proxy for firm performance for a 
firm f in year y. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of firm assets to the book value 
of firm assets (Tobin 1969). Previous studies have discussed the benefits of using Tobin’s 
Q to evaluate firm performance (Lang and Stulz 1993; Yermack 1996; Brown and Caylor 
2006).  
X is a vector of observable characteristics consisting of ‘Size’, which is the 
natural logarithm of total assets, ‘FirmAge’, which is the natural logarithm of firm age, 
and ‘Dividend’, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if dividends were paid in the 
current year. In my study, I use ‘Size’, ‘FirmAge’ (Brown and Caylor 2006) and 
‘Dividend’ (Servaes 1996) as control variables to be consistent with Perryman et al. 
(2015). I expect a negative coefficient for ‘Size’ since larger firms have relatively lower 
Tobin’s Q compared to smaller firms (Lang and Stulz 1993). For ‘FirmAge’, I also 
expect a negative coefficient since younger firms experience faster growth and have more 
intangible assets. The ‘Dividend’ indicator variable denotes access to capital (Servaes 
1996). ‘Ind’ is an industry fixed effect, ‘Y’ is a year fixed effect, and ε is an error term 
with the usual properties. I cluster the sample for firm performance by firm. The 
independent variable of interest is ‘Genderfy’, which is the proportion of female 
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executives within a firm f in a given year y. I posit that firms with greater gender diversity 
in executive and CEO positions will display higher performance than firms with lower 
levels of gender diversity.  
 Table 4A shows the results of the firm performance hypothesis and presents the 
results of the regression where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Column 6 of Table 
4A reveals that the ‘Genderfy’ variable is statistically insignificant for firm performance. 
My findings are different to existing literature where they find a positive and significant 
coefficient for the variable ‘Genderfy’. The findings of my study may differ from the 
Perryman et al. (2015) study because I broaden the scope of firms analyzed to S&P 1500 
companies as opposed to restricting the analysis to just S&P 500 companies.9 Also, I 
utilize data from more current time periods than previous literature.  
 As the presence of females increase within executive teams, the performance of a 
firm appears to experience a neutral effect, which may indicate firm performance may be 
evolving to be more gender blind. An implication of my findings may suggest that the 
performance of firms is becoming more equally influenced by both genders due to the 
immaterial effect found for gender diversity. Marinelli et al. (2016) complements the 
results of my study, where they find results that suggest there is no gender gap in the 
quality of portfolios. Their findings suggest there is no difference in portfolio liquidity 
and diversification between genders despite the differences in investment behavior. 
Overall, the results of my study reject the hypothesis that firms with greater gender 
                                                          
9 The results restricting to S&P 500 companies for firm performance, displayed in Table 7, show 
that the independent variable of interest, ‘Genderfy’, is also negative and insignificant, and further 
lending support to my study’s main findings. 
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diversity will display improved firm performance and instead suggest that gender 
diversity appears to have a neutral effect on firm performance.     
 Furthermore, when I investigate why the coefficient of ‘Genderfy’ is negative and 
insignificant, I find that the variable of Tobin’s Q, ‘TQfy’, possesses extreme outliers 
within the data. To evaluate the robustness of these findings, I re-estimate the firm 
performance model first using a sample that trims the top 1% of the observations.10 In the 
second re-estimation of model (2), I now use a winsorized ‘TQfy’ to evaluate the 
robustness of my study’s main findings. Winsorizing the Tobin’s Q variable at the 1% 
level is a way to minimize the influence of outliers in the data. Table 4B reveals that the 
outliers of the top 1% of the sample are driving the coefficient switch from positive to 
negative for the ‘Genderfy’ variable, however, the coefficient remains insignificant.   
4.3 Executive Compensation  
 I first estimate the effects of gender diversity on executive compensation using a 
model of the following form:   
(3)   𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑𝑌 + 𝜖𝑓𝑦 
where ‘Cefy’ is the log of total compensation (Salary, Bonus, and Stock Options) of 
executive e, from firm f, in year y, respectively. I take the natural log of total 
compensation because monetary amounts typically encounter sources of skewed 
                                                          
10 There are 67 observations that get dropped out when the sample is trimmed by the top 1% of 
observations. The industries that drop out that have the highest frequencies are pharmaceutical 
preparation companies, prepackaged software companies, and biological product companies. In 
future studies, further investigation could be done to explain why these specific industries have 
such high Tobin’s Qs.  
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distributions. Therefore, by taking the natural log of compensation, the input variable is 
now normally distributed. 
 X is a vector of observable characteristics of ‘Size’, which is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, ‘ROA’, which is the return on assets, ‘RET’, which is the annual 
percentage increase in stock price, ‘MTB’, which is the market-to-book ratio, ‘ExAge’, 
which is the age of an executive, and ‘Tenure_LeftCEO’ and ‘Tenure_CurrentCEO’, 
which is the length of service at a particular firm of a CEO. I use ‘Size’, ‘ROA’, and 
‘RET’11 as proxies for firm size and firm performance respectively (Balsam, Fernando, 
and Tripathy 2011). Controlling for future growth opportunities, I include the market-to-
book ratio ‘MTB’ as a control variable (Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993). I 
use two variables to capture an executive’s experience: ‘ExAge’, which represents the 
age of an executive and ‘TenureLeftCEO’ and ‘TenureCurrentCEO’, which represent an 
executive’s experience at a firm. ‘Ind’ is an industry fixed effect, ‘Y’ is a year fixed 
effect, and ε is an error term with the usual properties. I cluster the sample for firm 
executive compensation by firm and year. The independent variable of interest is 
‘DGenderefy’, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the executive is a female and 0 
otherwise. I posit that female executives will receive a lower compensation than their 
male executive counterparts.  
According to Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient of ‘DGenderefy’ is negative and 
significant (Coefficient = -0.063; Standard Error = 0.014). The results indicate that if an 
                                                          
11 The mean and standard deviation of variable ‘RET’ differs greatly from Perryman et al. (2015). 
Their study finds a negative mean ‘RET’ and an extremely high standard deviation. This may be 
a result of them using the raw share price instead of the holding period return, which I use in this 
paper to calculate the variable. I also winsorize the variables ‘RET’, ‘stdEPS’, and ‘StdRet’ at the 
1% level to minimize the influence of outliers in the data. 
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executive is female, her compensation at the firm is significantly lower than the 
compensation of male executives. The findings of Panel A align with Perryman, 
Fernando, and Tripathy (2015), however, the gender compensation gap has declined in 
the more recent time period. The narrowing of the gender compensation gap 
complements Elkinawy and Stater (2011) who find that the base salaries received by 
female executives improved to a range of 4.5-5.5 percent compared to Bell’s (2005) 
study where she finds that women earned 8-25 percent less than males. Findings of my 
study support the hypothesis that female executives receive lower compensation packages 
than male executives.  
Simply controlling for an executive’s gender however does not fully get at gender 
diversity. As such, I now examine the effects of gender diversity on executive 
compensation by estimating a model of the following form:   
(4)   𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿3𝐹𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑦 +
                                                                           𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑𝑌 + 𝜖𝑓𝑦 
where ‘Genderfy’ is the proportion of female executives within firm f, in year y and 
‘FGenderefy’ is ‘DGenderefy’ multiplied by ‘Genderfy’ of executive e, from firm f, in year 
y, respectively. All other variables are previously defined. I use the interaction variable 
‘FGenderefy’ to evaluate the moderating effect of gender diversity on executive 
compensation (Dawson 2014). The variable of interest is ‘FGenderefy’. I hypothesize here 
that greater gender diversity among executives will lead to smaller compensation 
differences between male and female top executives.     
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Panel B of Table 5 illustrates that the coefficient of ‘DGenderefy’ is negative and 
significant (Coefficient = -0.282; Standard Error = 0.030) and the coefficient on 
‘FGenderefy’ is positive and significant (Coefficient = 0.897; Standard Error = 0.129). 
The interaction variable, ‘FGenderefy’, shows that as gender diversity increases within a 
firm, the difference between male and female executive compensation decreases. The 
findings of Panel B complement Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer’s (2010) study in which they 
find that in women-led firms, compensation for a female manager increases while 
compensation for a male manager decreases. This in turn leads to a smaller wage gap 
between genders. Overall, my findings support the hypothesis that as gender diversity 
increases among executives, the gender wage gap between executive compensation 
narrows.   
In order to further investigate the full effects of gender diversity on executive 
compensation, the impact of gender diversity on specifically CEO executives is broken 
out. As such, I estimate a model of the following form:  
(5)   𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿3𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑒𝑓𝑦 +
                                                                       𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑𝑌 + 𝜖𝑓𝑦 
where ‘DCEOefy’ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the executive is a CEO and 0 
otherwise for an executive e, from firm f in year y. ‘FCEOefy’ is ‘DGenderefy’ multiplied 
by ‘DCEOefy’ and all other variables are previously defined. I use the interaction variable, 
‘FCEOefy’, to evaluate the moderating effect of gender diversity on specifically CEO 
compensation. The variable of interests are ‘DCEOefy’ and ‘FCEOefy’. I posit here that 
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greater gender diversity among CEOs will lead to smaller compensation differences 
between male and female executives overall.  
 In Panel C of Table 5, I take out the variables ‘Genderfy’ and ‘FGenderefy’ to test 
the effect of gender diversity on the compensation of specifically CEO executives within 
a firm. The coefficient of ‘DGenderefy’ is negative and significant (Coefficient = -0.077; 
Standard Error = 0.013). The coefficient for the independent variable of interest 
‘DCEOefy’ is positive and significant (Coefficient = 0.641; Standard Error = 0.017) and 
the coefficient for the interaction variable ‘FCEOefy’ is also positive and significant 
(Coefficient = 0.361; t-stat = 0.046). The results tabulated in Panel C indicate that if 
gender diversity increases, female executive compensation is lower than the 
compensation of male executives. However, if a female executive is a CEO, her 
compensation is higher than the compensation of a male CEO. My findings here diverge 
from existing literature where studies find that boards design compensation packages that 
award female and male CEOs practically the same proportions of risky compensation 
components (Khan and Vieito 2013). Results from my study suggest that women CEO 
receive higher compensation than male CEOs, which in turn may cause the gender wage 
gap of executive compensation to narrow. Overall, my findings support the hypothesis 
that greater gender diversity among CEOs will lead to smaller compensation differences 
between male and female executives.     
 Lastly, in order to fully examine the effects of gender diversity on both executive 
and CEO compensation, I estimate the model of the following form:  
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(6)  𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿3𝐹𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑦 +
                                                   𝛿4𝐷𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝛿5𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑒𝑓𝑦 + 𝜑𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑𝑌 + 𝜖𝑓𝑦 
All variables are previously defined. Similar to the results of Panel C of Table 5, 
Panel D of Table 5 illustrates that the coefficient of ‘DGenderefy’ is negative and 
significant (Coefficient = -0.262; Standard Error = 0.028), which again indicates that if 
the executive is female, the compensation she receives is lower than that of male 
executives. The coefficient on variable ‘FGendereft’, ‘DCEOefy’, and ‘FCEOefy’ are all 
positive and significant, which shows that as gender diversity increases within firms, the 
compensation differences between male and female executives lessens.  
Taken together, the results of all four panels are consistent with existing literature 
and suggest that increases in gender diversity have a positive effect on total 
compensation. While female executives still receive less compensation than male 
executives, my findings here suggest that female CEOs receive a higher compensation 
than male CEOs in S&P 1500 firms. Thus, my results imply that as gender diversity 
increases within firm executives, the executive compensation gap between males and 
females narrows. Overall, my results support the hypothesis of all four panels and 
complement the existing literature on gender diversity and executive compensation.12     
V. Conclusion   
 Despite the advancements women have made in the workforce in recent years, the 
persisting gender imbalance of top executives and CEOs in S&P 1500 companies makes 
                                                          
12 Table 8 re-estimates the executive compensation models and restricts the sample to only S&P 
500 companies. The findings of the sensitivity analysis are consistent with the main findings of 
my study as well as the existing literature.    
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gender diversity a continuing topic of concern. Existing literature indicates that firms 
with female executives and CEOs are associated with lower firm risk and higher firm 
performance (Khan and Vieito 2013; Perryman, Fernando, and Tripathy 2015). Perryman 
et al. (2015) also find the compensation female executives receive is lower than the 
compensation male executives receive. Interestingly, the existing literature also indicates 
that as gender diversity increases among executives and CEOs, the gender wage gap of 
executive compensation narrows.    
 In order to build upon the analysis from existing literature, I address the 
shortcomings of previous literature and broaden the scope of firms analyzed in the 
sample. A limitation in the previous literature of Perryman et al. (2015) is that their data 
only spans from 1992 to 2012. The demographic of executives within firms has also 
evolved and improved since 2012, so it is important to re-analyze the models with new 
time periods. In order to correct the existing literature’s limitation, I analyze data from 
2012 to 2017. Additionally, the previous literature does not examine the specific effects 
of gender diversity within the CEO position. Perryman et al. (2015) examines the 
proportion of female executives within a firm but does not include a variable solely 
quantifying the effects of female CEOs. In order to address this shortcoming, I add an 
indicator variable ‘DCEO’ and an interaction variable ‘FCEO’ to analyze the effects of 
the CEO’s gender on executive compensation. Lastly, Perryman et al. (2015) restricts 
their sample to only S&P 500 companies. I broaden the scope of analysis to include S&P 
Composite 1500 companies to examine the impact of gender diversity on executives of a 
larger range of U.S. market capitalization.   
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 Using data from Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp from 2012 to 2017, I 
formally analyze the influence that gender diversity among executives has on firm risk, 
firm performance and executive compensation of S&P 1500 companies. I use three 
different samples to evaluate firm risk, firm performance, and executive compensation 
respectively. All models in my study use OLS and I adjust the standard errors to correct 
for auto correlation by clustering by firm for the firm risk and performance models while 
clustering by firm and year for the executive compensation model as per Peterson (2009).  
Moreover, I include year and industry fixed effects in all models to take into account for 
any possible time and industry specific effects not captured by the explanatory variables. 
The industries are classified based on the Fama-French 12-industry classification (Fama 
and French 1997). I hypothesize before analyzing the data that firms with higher levels of 
gender diversity in executive and CEO positions will display less risk and higher 
performance than firms with lower levels of gender diversity. I also posit that first, 
female executives will receive a lower compensation than male executives, and second, 
that greater gender diversity among executives, specifically CEOs, will lead to a smaller 
compensation differences between male and female executives.   
 The findings of my paper suggest that gender diversity within executives appears 
to have a neutral effect on firm risk and firm performance. The different findings of my 
study may reflect the improvements of the workplace since 2012 in terms of gender 
equality. With more and more firms advocating their status as an equal opportunity 
employer over the years (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016), the progress made towards 
gender equality within firms may contribute to the different findings of my study. An 
increase in gender diversity is now found to neutrally effect firms risk and performance, 
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which differs to past findings where the presence of female executives had a significant 
impact on firms. The neutral findings may suggest progress is being made towards a 
more gender blind economy. Lastly, results from my study suggest that an increase in 
gender diversity among executives, specifically CEOs, reduces the gender wage gap at 
the top executive level. While my findings still show that the average female executives 
receive lower compensation than the average male executives, my findings show that the 
average female CEOs receive a higher level of compensation than the average male 
CEOs. Gender diversity effects executive compensation by decreasing the discrepancy 
between genders. The results for firm risk and firm performance in this study differ to the 
existing literature while findings from this study for executive compensation are 
consistent with the existing literature. In closing, my findings suggest that increases in 
gender diversity among executives has no significant influence on firm risk and 
performance, and also plays a role in narrowing the gender wage gap at the executive and 
CEO level.     
5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
 A limitation to my study, which is the same limitation faced in previous literature, 
is that as changes in gender diversity occur within the workforce, the topics of firm risk, 
performance, and executive compensation should be revisited in order to reflect the 
current advancements. Furthermore, my study examines gender diversity on S&P 1500 
companies as a whole. A future study could break down the S&P Composite 1500 and 
examine if there are any differences in effect of gender diversity between S&P 500, the 
S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. Additionally, my study only focuses on 
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data from firms traded on the U.S. stock market, and therefore the findings reflect 
Western-based culture and social changes within the United States. A topic for future 
research could be assessing the impact of gender diversity on firms in other cultures and 
countries and compare it back to the results found in America (Perryman et al. 2015). 
 My study also only focuses on demographic diversity within firms, i.e. gender. 
More nuanced findings are possible with the additional analysis of the effect of cognitive 
diversity, i.e. education and values, within firms. As a result, decision-making may be 
better understood as both a cognitive and emotional process. A future study could obtain 
or proxy the measurement of how senior leaders feel about their options, the group 
decision-making process itself, and the final choice. The proxies may show differences 
unseen in cognitive evaluations (Perryman et al. 2015). Lastly, many economic decisions 
within firms are made in group, rather than individually. The choices of a single 
individual such as the CEO may shape the outcome of the entire group’s opinion and 
decision as well as those outside the group (Perryman et al. 2015). A future research topic 
could zoom in on companies of the current 24 female CEOs in the S&P 500 and compare 
vertically within the firm. As women take on more executive and CEO roles within firms, 
future research could capitalize on the larger female representation ratio and further 
examine how female leadership may affect decision, risk, and performance outcomes.  
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VI. Appendix  
TABLE 1 
 Data Definitions  
 
  Variable 
 
Beta 
Measures the systematic risk of an individual firm. Computed from Beta Suite by 
WRDS  
StdRet Measure of total risk – standard deviation of daily returns over a calendar year 
TQ Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value 
logComp Natural logarithm of total compensation (Salary + Bonus + Stock Options) 
Total Comp ($’000)  Total compensation (Salary + Bonus + Stock Options) received by an executive  
Salary ($’000) Salary component of compensation  
Gender The proportion of female executives in a top management team  
DGender Dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive is a female 
FGender Interaction variable between Gender and DGender 
DCEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive is a CEO 
FCEO Interaction variable between DGender and DCEO 
MVE ($MM) Market value of equity  
Sales ($MM) Net sales revenue 
ROA Return on assets – net income scaled by total assets 
RET Annual percentage increase in stock price 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
lnDBEQ Natural logarithm of debt to equity ratio 
FirmAge 
Natural logarithm of firm age, a proxy for firm age is computed from the first date 
of firm’s stock price appears in CRSP  
stdEPS Standard deviation of earnings over the previous five years 
Dividend Dummy variable equal to 1 if dividends are paid in the current year  
MTB Market-to-book ratio. Proxies for growth opportunities 
ExAge Age of the executive from the ExecuComp database 
Tenure_LeftCEO 
Length of service at a particular firm of a CEO who has left the firm, computed 
from when an executive first appeared under a particular firm in the ExecuComp 
database  
Tenure_CurrentCEO 
Length of service at a particular firm of a current CEO, computed from when an 
executive first appeared under a particular firm in the ExecuComp database   
YY1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm variables are from year 2012  
YY2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm variables are from year 2013 
YY3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm variables are from year 2014 
YY4 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm variables are from year 2015 
YY5 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm variables are from year 2016 
YY6 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm variables are from year 2017 
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TABLE 1 (continue) 
Data Definitions  
  
Variable   
indus1  Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Consumer Non-Durables 
indus2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Consumer Durables 
indus3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Manufacturing  
indus4 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Energy Oil, Gas, and Coal 
Extraction and Products 
indus5 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Chemicals and Allied Products  
indus6 Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Business Equipment  
indus7 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Telephone and Television 
Transmission 
indus8 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Utilities (Industry not included 
in study)  
indus9 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Wholesale, Retail, and Some 
Services  
indus10 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs  
indus11 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Money and Finance (Industry 
not included in study)  
indus12 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as Other - Mines, Constr, BldMt, 
Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment 
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TABLE 2 
   Descriptive Statistics  
   Mean and (Standard Deviation)  
   
 
   Panel A - sample to evaluate firm risk 
Variable  
Total 
(1) 
Low 
(2) 
High 
(3) 
Beta 
1.220 1.231 1.190* 
(0.754) (0.764) (0.724) 
Standard Deviation of Returns (StdRet) 
0.336 0.341 0.322*** 
(0.141) (0.145) (0.128) 
Size  
7.711 7.700 7.744 
(1.647) (1.653) (1.631) 
Log of Debt to Equity Ratio (lnDBEQ) 
0.096 0.104 0.073 
(1.077) (1.066) (1.108) 
FirmAge 
3.036 3.017 3.092*** 
(0.787) (0.776) (0.817) 
Standard Deviation of Earnings (stdEPS) 
0.014 0.015 0.013** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.021) 
Gender  
0.071 0.017 0.225*** 
(0.107) (0.035) (0.096) 
    
    
Panel B - sample to evaluate firm performance 
Variable  
Total 
(1) 
Low 
(2) 
High 
(3) 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 
2.097 2.121 2.024* 
(1.364) (1.454) (1.057) 
Size 
7.708 7.699 7.734 
(1.641) (1.648) (1.618) 
FirmAge 
3.034 3.010 3.102*** 
(0.791) (0.780) (0.819) 
Dividend  
0.557 0.548 0.583^^^ 
(0.497) (0.498) (0.493) 
Gender  
0.071 0.017 0.225*** 
(0.107) (0.035) (0.096) 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.    
*** / ^^^ Indicate significance at 1% two-tailed / one-tailed   
** / ^^ Indicate significance at 5% two-tailed / one-tailed   
* / ^ Indicate significance at 10% two-tailed / one-tailed    
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TABLE 2 (continue)  
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean and (Standard Deviation)  
 
Panel C - sample to evaluate executive compensation 
Variable  
Total 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
Male CEO 
(4) 
Female CEO 
(5) 
Total Compensation 
($'000) 
3225.579 3263.299 2747.333*** 3192.473 8072.677*** 
(4995.537) (5042.022) (4335.92) (4942.719) (8858.741) 
logComp 
7.552 7.565 7.394*** 7.546 8.517*** 
(1.059) (1.066) (0.954) (1.057) (0.995) 
Size  
7.775 7.780 7.708** 7.774 7.916** 
(1.627) (1.626) (1.641) (1.626) (1.817) 
Return on Asset (ROA) 
0.037 0.036 0.050*** 0.037 0.058** 
(0.132) (0.134) (0.102) (0.132) (0.092) 
Percentage Increase in 
Stock Price (RET) 
0.165 0.165 0.168 0.165 0.178** 
(0.440) (0.441) (0.433) (0.440) (0.513) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
(MTB) 
4.369 4.313 5.089 4.347 7.639 
(53.021) (54.086) (36.954) (53.048) (48.872) 
ExAge  
53.745 53.859 52.302*** 53.742 54.210*** 
(7.352) (7.414) (6.340) (7.358) (6.306) 
Tenure LeftCEO 
0.805 0.850 0.237*** 0.805 0.758*** 
(3.797) (3.909) (1.767) (3.801) (3.103) 
Tenure CurrentCEO 
2.457 2.576 0.958*** 2.431 6.310*** 
(6.006) (6.151) (3.353) (6.003) (5.113) 
Gender 
0.071 0.059 0.231***   0.070 0.277 
(0.107) (0.093) (0.136) (0.105) (0.152) 
DGender 
0.073 
  
0.067 
 
(0.260) 
  
(0.250) 
 
FGender 
0.017 
 
0.231 0.015 0.277*** 
(0.070) 
 
(0.136) (0.066) (0.152) 
DCEO 
0.166 0.172 0.093*** 0.160 
 
(0.372) (0.377) (0.290) (0.367) 
 
FCEO 
0.007 
 
0.093 
  
(0.082) 
 
(0.290) 
  
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.   
 
  *** / ^^^ Indicate significance at 1% two-tailed / one-tailed 
  ** / ^^ Indicate significance at 5% two-tailed / one-tailed 
* / ^ Indicate significance at 10% two-tailed / one-tailed  
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TABLE 3 
 
     
 
The impact of gender diversity on firm risk  
  
 
  
     
 
 Panel A – Dependent Variable: ‘Beta’   
Independent 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gender  
-0.215* -0.220* -0.212 -0.208 -0.203 -0.206 -0.025 
(0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.123) 
Size   
-0.027*** -0.044*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Natural Log of Debt to 
Equity Ratio (lnDBEQ) 
 
0.067*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
stdEPS    
2.438*** 2.418*** 2.498*** 2.028*** 
   
(0.581) (0.580) (0.575) (0.560) 
FirmAge      
-0.020 -0.019 -0.024 
    
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Intercept  
1.236*** 1.442*** 1.571*** 1.466*** 1.508*** 1.612*** 1.326*** 
(0.017) (0.067) (0.075) (0.077) (0.087) (0.095) (0.102) 
Year dummy 
included  
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included  
No No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.     
*** Indicate significance at 1%      
** Indicate significance at 5%     
* Indicate significance at 10%      
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TABLE 3 (continue)       
The impact of gender diversity on firm risk     
 
      
 
 Panel B – Dependent Variable: ‘StdRet’   
Independent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gender  
-0.055** -0.061** -0.059** -0.056*** -0.051** -0.050** -0.022 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Size   
-0.036*** -0.041*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.036*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Natural Log of Debt to 
Equity Ratio (lnDBEQ) 
 
0.019*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
stdEPS    
1.856*** 1.832*** 1.796*** 1.587*** 
   
(0.116) (0.116) (0.113) (0.100) 
FirmAge      
-0.024*** -0.024*** -0.020*** 
    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Intercept  
0.340*** 0.615*** 0.652*** 0.573*** 0.623*** 0.625*** 0.624*** 
(0.004) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
Year dummy 
included  
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included 
No No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.39 
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
   
 
*** Indicate significance at 1% 
   
 
** Indicate significance at 5% 
   
 
* Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 4A  
     
 
The impact of gender diversity on firm performance  
   
 
 
     
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender  
-0.186 -0.208 -0.209 -0.187 -0.186 -0.309 
(0.278) (0.274) (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) (0.269) 
Size   
-0.110*** -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.083*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Dividend   
0.010 0.047 0.045 0.134* 
  
(0.072) (0.075) (0.075) (0.071) 
FirmAge    
-0.089** -0.088** -0.102*** 
   
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
Intercept  
2.110*** 2.959*** 2.961*** 3.159*** 2.898*** 2.843*** 
(0.042) (0.176) (0.176) (0.196) (0.193) (0.215) 
Year dummy included No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included 
No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 
Observations 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
    
 
*** Indicate significance at 1% 
    
 
** Indicate significance at 5% 
    
 
* Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 4B  
     
 
The impact of gender diversity on firm performance (Trimming top 1% of ‘TQfy’ observations)   
 
     
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender  
0.162 0.143 0.134 0.153 0.154 0.016 
(0.249) (0.246) (0.245) (0.245) (0.244) (0.241) 
Size   
-0.073*** -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.055*** 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Dividend   
0.090 0.122** 0.120** 0.180*** 
  
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
FirmAge    
-0.077** -0.077** -0.091*** 
   
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Intercept  
2.005*** 2.566*** 2.588*** 2.761*** 2.581*** 2.557*** 
(0.032) (0.130) (0.133) (0.150) (0.154) (0.180) 
Year dummy included No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included 
No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 
Observations 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
    
 
*** Indicate significance at 1% 
    
 
** Indicate significance at 5% 
    
 
* Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 4C  
     
 
The impact of gender diversity on firm performance (Winsorizing ‘TQfy’ at 1% level)   
 
     
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender  
-0.080 -0.100 -0.103 -0.081 -0.080 -0.205 
(0.266) (0.262) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.257) 
Size   
-0.098*** -0.101*** -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Dividend   
0.033 0.071 0.069 0.148** 
  
(0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) 
FirmAge    
-0.090** -0.089** -0.103*** 
   
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) 
Intercept  
2.079*** 2.836*** 2.844*** 3.044*** 2.805*** 2.770*** 
(0.037) (0.153) (0.154) (0.175) (0.175) (0.201) 
Year dummy included No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included 
No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 
Observations 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
    
 
*** Indicate significance at 1% 
    
 
** Indicate significance at 5% 
    
 
* Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 5 
   
  The impact of gender diversity on executive compensation   
 
     
Panel A - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
Panel B - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
  Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
DGender -0.063*** (0.014) DGender -0.282*** (0.030) 
Size  0.386*** (0.005) Gender 0.071 (0.064) 
ROA 0.202*** (0.069) FGender 0.897*** (0.129) 
RET 0.056*** (0.015) Size 0.387*** (0.005) 
MTB 0.000*** 0.000 ROA 0.196*** (0.069) 
ExAge -0.001 (0.001) RET 0.056*** (0.015) 
Tenure LeftCEO -0.032*** (0.003) MTB 0.000*** (0.000) 
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.059*** (0.001) ExAge -0.001 (0.001) 
Intercept  4.414*** (0.057) Tenure LeftCEO -0.032*** (0.003) 
Industry and year 
dummies included   
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.058*** (0.001) 
  
Intercept  4.399*** (0.057) 
    
 
Industry and year dummies included 
R-Squared  
 
0.42 R-Squared 
 
0.42 
Observations    35,674 Observation 35,674 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.     
*** Indicate significance at 1%   
** Indicate significance at 5%   
* Indicate significance at 10%    
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TABLE 5 (continue)  
The impact of gender diversity on executive compensation  
  
Panel C - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
Panel D - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
  Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
DGender -0.078*** (0.013) DGender -0.262*** (0.028) 
DCEO 0.641*** (0.017) Gender 0.069 (0.063) 
FCEO  0.361*** (0.046) FGender 0.767*** (0.125) 
Size 0.383*** (0.005) DCEO 0.642*** (0.017) 
ROA 0.186*** (0.068) FCEO 0.318*** (0.046) 
RET 0.050*** (0.014) Size 0.384*** (0.005) 
MTB 0.000*** (0.000) ROA 0.181*** (0.068) 
ExAge 0.001 (0.001) RET 0.050*** (0.014) 
Tenure LeftCEO -0.002 (0.003) MTB 0.000*** (0.000) 
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.026*** (0.001) ExAge 0.001 (0.001) 
Intercept  4.280*** (0.056) Tenure LeftCEO -0.002 (0.003) 
Industry and year 
dummies included 
  
  
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.026*** (0.001) 
  
Intercept  4.266*** (0.056) 
    Industry and year dummies included 
R-squared  
 
0.45 R-Squared  
 
0.45 
Observations   35,674 Observations  35,674 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
    *** Indicate significance at 1% 
    ** Indicate significance at 5% 
    * Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 6 
 
     
 
The impact of gender diversity on firm risk for S&P 500 companies  
  
     
 
 Panel A – Dependent Variable: ‘Beta’   
Independent 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gender  
-0.007 -0.009 -0.010 0.001 0.078 0.084 0.399** 
(0.223) (0.223) (0.224) (0.219) (0.216) (0.216) (0.198) 
Size   
-0.023 -0.024 -0.018 -0.005 -0.002 -0.020 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Natural Log of Debt to 
Equity Ratio (lnDBEQ) 
 
0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001   0.013 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
stdEPS    
5.004*** 4.813*** 4.949*** 3.643** 
   
(1.640) (1.617) (1.633) (1.440) 
FirmAge      
-0.071*** -0.071*** -0.076*** 
    
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) 
Intercept  
1.093*** 1.311*** 1.315*** 1.208*** 1.322*** 1.398*** 1.175*** 
(0.026) (0.167) (0.173) (0.172) (0.177) (0.189) (0.175) 
Year dummy 
included  
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included  
No No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.15 
Observations 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.     
*** Indicate significance at 1%      
** Indicate significance at 5%     
* Indicate significance at 10%      
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TABLE 6 (continue)       
The impact of gender diversity on firm risk for S&P 500 companies     
 
      
 
 Panel B – Dependent Variable: ‘StdRet’   
Independent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gender  
0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.013 0.037 0.039 0.075** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
Size   
-0.019*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Natural Log of Debt to 
Equity Ratio (lnDBEQ) 
 
0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
stdEPS    
2.64*** 2.567*** 2.473*** 2.033*** 
   
(0.398) (0.401) (0.391) (0.354) 
FirmAge      
-0.025*** -0.026*** -0.023*** 
    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Intercept  
0.269*** 0.453*** 0.454*** 0.398*** 0.438*** 0.456*** 0.478*** 
(0.005) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.034) 
Year dummy 
included  
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included 
No No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.32 
Observations 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
   
 
*** Indicate significance at 1% 
   
 
** Indicate significance at 5% 
   
 
* Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 7 
     
 
The impact of gender diversity on firm performance for S&P 500 companies    
 
     
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender  
-0.390 -0.426 -0.215 -0.257 -0.275 -0.797 
(0.557) (0.520) (0.498) (0.507) (0.506) (0.510) 
Size   
-0.465*** -0.417*** -0.423*** -0.434*** -0.404*** 
 
(0.074) (0.066) (0.069) (0.070) (0.073) 
Dividend   
-0.466*** -0.489*** -0.493*** -0.313** 
  
(0.173) (0.182) (0.182) (0.159) 
FirmAge    
0.049 0.050 0.022 
   
(0.071) (0.071) (0.069) 
Intercept  
2.359*** 6.736*** 6.625*** 6.540*** 6.323*** 6.338*** 
(0.083) (0.739) (0.703) (0.674) (0.648) (0.666) 
Year dummy included No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
included 
No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.23 
Observations 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
    
 
*** Indicate significance at 1% 
    
 
** Indicate significance at 5% 
    
 
* Indicate significance at 10%  
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TABLE 8 
   
  The impact of gender diversity on executive compensation on S&P 500 companies 
 
     
Panel A - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
Panel B - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
  Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
DGender -0.048** (0.023) DGender -0.150*** (0.053) 
Size  0.322*** (0.010) Gender 0.068 (0.117) 
ROA 0.215 (0.197) FGender 0.447* (0.248) 
RET 0.093*** (0.031) Size 0.322*** (0.010) 
MTB 0.000*** 0.000 ROA 0.216   (0.197) 
ExAge -0.000 (0.001) RET 0.094*** (0.031) 
Tenure LeftCEO -0.035*** (0.004) MTB 0.000*** (0.000) 
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.073*** (0.003) ExAge -0.000 (0.001) 
Intercept  4.979*** (0.116) Tenure LeftCEO -0.035*** (0.004) 
Industry and year 
dummies included   
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.073*** (0.003) 
  
Intercept  4.970*** (0.117) 
    
 
Industry and year dummies included 
R-Squared  
 
0.29 R-Squared 
 
0.42 
Observations    11,700 Observation 11,700 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.     
*** Indicate significance at 1%   
** Indicate significance at 5%   
* Indicate significance at 10%    
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TABLE 8 (continue)  
The impact of gender diversity on executive compensation on S&P 500 companies 
  
Panel C - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
Panel D - Dependent Variable: Log total 
compensation 
  Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
DGender -0.064*** (0.021) DGender -0.134*** (0.050) 
DCEO 0.602*** (0.028) Gender 0.049 (0.117) 
FCEO  0.395*** (0.074) FGender 0.309 (0.232) 
Size 0.317*** (0.010) DCEO 0.602*** (0.028) 
ROA 0.216 (0.194) FCEO 0.384*** (0.075) 
RET 0.086*** (0.031) Size 0.317*** (0.010) 
MTB 0.000*** (0.000) ROA 0.216 (0.194) 
ExAge 0.004** (0.001) RET 0.087*** (0.031) 
Tenure LeftCEO -0.004 (0.004) MTB 0.000*** (0.000) 
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.040*** (0.003) ExAge 0.004** (0.001) 
Intercept  4.792*** (0.115) Tenure LeftCEO -0.004 (0.004) 
Industry and year 
dummies included 
  
  
Tenure CurrentCEO 0.040*** (0.003) 
  
Intercept  4.786*** (0.116) 
    Industry and year dummies included 
R-squared  
 
0.33 R-Squared  
 
0.33 
Observations   11,700 Observations  11,700 
Refer Table 1 for data definitions.  
    *** Indicate significance at 1% 
    ** Indicate significance at 5% 
    * Indicate significance at 10%  
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